I. Anthropological Context

　　The very origin of Taiwan’s various identities arises from the historical movement of ethnic groups that have migrated to the island of Formosa over the course of four centuries. This is the most superficial distinction of identity in Taiwan, as the influx of many ethnic groups has shaped the various cultures of communities that have appeared in Taiwan. Originally, Aboriginal peoples such as but not limited to the initial population of Taiwan include the Ami, Tsou, and Atayal, who inhabited the region for millennia. Not long thereafter, the gradual migration of Ming Han Chinese began as there were more opportunities to expand the fishing industry, particularly from the nearby region of Fujian. Throughout this migration, Dutch interest particularly influenced by commercial strategy in the island becoming a trading post in Asia created an influx of the first Non-Asian groups to establish settlements on the island, officially founding Taiwan by way of a fort in Tainan in 1624. They were quickly followed in succession by the migration of groups from the Qing Dynasty. After the Japanese acquisition, ethnic Japanese moved to Taiwan to establish careers and presence on the island, such as those who were engineers, merchants, and soldiers. The post-Japanese era would usher in the Kuomintang (KMT), whose defeat to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on the mainland caused a move of the KMT to Taiwan in 1949, bringing domestic change. In the modern age, the reduced costs of transportation that have become more efficient allow for migration en masse, such as employment for manual jobs from surrounding Southeast Asian countries, or for corporate work with employees from across the globe.

II. Historical Political Ideation

　　While ethnicity has been a catalyst for the formation of observable divides in communities, the divide in political ideation goes hand-in-hand with the aforementioned differences. Given Taiwan’s numerous exchanges of governing bodies of the island over the course of four centuries, there lies little doubt in the fact that certain demographics will be in more agreement with a certain government’s policy compared to a preceding or succeeding government. The island of Taiwan has had the flags of six separate governing entities fly over it, in which each governing body has had intermittent communities that are allied with it or opposed to it. The first to stake a sovereign claim over the island was the Dutch Monarchy, which saw value in an outpost directly in Asia to help facilitate the trade of sugar. This saw increasing opposition from Aboriginals and Chinese already on the island as the Dutch began to levy taxes. The Dutch were driven out by a Ming-loyal pirate named Koxinga, who ruled for a short period with a period of food shortage. This led to a Qing acquisition of the island, with policies passed in order to weed out Ming loyalists through strategies like moving populations inland on the mainland and isolating Taiwan. Those who were affiliated with the Ming faced consequences for their political ideation.  1895   As Taiwan was later acquired by the Japanese Empire through a treaty, members of the Peony Tribe clashed with the ruling forces in an event known as the Peony Tribe Affair. This clash created a poor reputation of the Qing rule of Taiwan to the Japanese, who thus sought to covet the island as a means of “justness” to make up for the incident. After Japanese rule, a brief stint of independent rule of the Republic of Taiwan gave way to the Republic of China as they departed from the mainland. The change of ruling powers over an island of communities with many backgrounds becomes analogous to many situations of polarization later on, as will be represented by ethnic affiliations, regime alignment, class differences, and generational experiences.

III. Ethnic and Cultural Affiliation

　　A wide range of communities exist within Taiwan, with influxes of different groups occurring at different points in history. However, the contemporary period is the point in which there is the largest variation in ethnic communities living in Taiwan, each with different values or goals for being in Taiwan. The differences of communities can be underlined in two broad ways: by geographic boundary and by ideology or values. Geographic boundaries indicate that certain groups live mostly unintegrated and within their communities. These include mountain Aboriginal groups, in which communities of such live on the Eastern side of Taiwan, as opposed to those in the plains who have intermarried with Han Chinese. Eastern Aboriginal groups thus still have traditions that have been kept intact for several centuries, the practices of which are still done today.

　　The values of certain migrating ethnic groups or general communities also carry over to the island. Emphasis on education, family priorities, entrepreneurship, and other such values are present in certain cultures over others, which also creates differences between the identities of certain communities as they participate in activities more akin to the values of their culture or heritage. At the same time, this also implies that many groups will have similar preferences or voting behaviors regarding policies or general political parties representing policies that underscore a certain value or values that that community is in agreement with. At the same time, this offers new perspectives on ways Taiwan is able to show the ability to be progressive in creating environments supporting the views central to certain groups.

IV. Generational Experiences

　　While the KMT had been established as a republic, its form of governance was largely authoritarian and remained so on the island of Taiwan until 1987, when martial law was lifted. This was exemplified during the February 28th Affair - Chiang Kai-shek’s government utilized brute police force to quell a popular uprising that demanded justice in a case in which a bystander was struck by the stray bullet of a police officer who fired a gun into a crowd during a street confrontation. This event served as the catalyst for Taiwanese citizens’ growing disappointment in Chiang Kai-shek’s government, in which they expected an ethnically Han Chinese government to treat the citizens with less harshness than the Japanese. It also was largely the cause for Taiwanese to begin an internal debate - were the KMT truly similar to them simply because of Han ancestry, or were they to be seen as outsiders and controllers to the Han subgroups who have already formed communities in Taiwan for generations? After February of 1947, protests calling for a re-evaluation of martial law in Taiwan were spread across the country, with the fatalities of protesters as a grave result. For the Taiwanese who lived under Japanese rule and were spared the brutality of the Japanese during WWII, the KMT’s aggression came as a surprise - in fact, many almost saw it as hypocritical as many from the mainland did in fact experience Japanese brutality. However, difficulty arises when considering that the Republic of China (under the KMT government at the time) had a “hard constitution”, making amendments extremely difficult.  In 1949, KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek ushered military forces and government personnel to Taiwan after losing the civil war in mainland China to the Chinese Communist Party. This influx brought in an additional two million people, from varying regions of China as compared to the already established Chinese communities from Fujian and Guangdong. At this point, polarization began to take root between the KMT population and the six million who already lived in Taiwan, let alone the fact that these communities spoke Japanese, Hakka, and Hokkien as opposed to the newcomers who spoke Mandarin. As the KMT believed in re-taking the mainland, strict, authoritarian policy established across the island became synonymous with how older generations of Taiwanese remembered governance on the island until the lift of martial law. Inherently, some individuals from an era in which authoritarian control was considered normal may thus also still consider relatively more authoritarian or stricter governments as typical. This is also a reflection of the descendants of the KMT, who feel particular cultural ties to the mainland to this day.

　　Taiwan’s democratic shift was drastic and occurred approximately thirty years ago. As the civil war for control over China began showing itself as a non-zero-sum game, the KMT diverted funding initially meant for war towards infrastructural progress on the island. The first indicator of democratic turnaround, younger generations then born after the lifting of martial law in 1987 finally began to see Taiwan’s realized democratic potential. Several reforms following Chiang Kai-shek’s presidency moved Taiwan to democratic status. When Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek’s son, took office, he passed a policy that allowed for a multi-party system in Taiwan. The tolerance for opposing political competition is a facet of democracy that allows for better representation of civilians in a republic. Furthermore, Chiang’s successor, Lee Teng-hui, along with being the first Taiwanese-born leader was re-elected by vote for the first time in Taiwan’s history, establishing the nation as a democracy at that point. Individuals who grew up in an era that has seen this change have an appreciation and thus may be more polarized in opinions on governance compared to those of previous or future generations.

V. Regime Alignment

　　The concept that casts the greatest shadow over the polarization of Taiwanese identities is that of Taiwan’s position on the status quo（China）. The various beliefs on whether or not Taiwan should keep the status quo normative is an indicator of the belief on how Taiwan’s government aligns with regimes. The “status quo” is particularly defined in newly elected Taiwanese Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) President Lai Ching-te’s inaugural speech as maintaining the current status of Taiwan in a geopolitical context, enforcing that Taiwan does not need a claim of independence because it already has a sovereign, operating government and will not provoke nor yield to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and maintains a position that aims simply to not provoke or invite a negative reaction from China. This political position is indicative of a moderate identity and is supported by 80% of Taiwanese as of 2022, as per an NCCU study. Thus, a majority of Taiwanese remain supportive of a government that takes a path of geopolitical stability in the context of cross-strait relations. This moderate stance remains the most popular as it keeps economic ties with the mainland intact to reduce potential harm on Taiwan’s private sector, while also maintaining the concept of sovereignty discretely to keep the Chinese military at arm’s length.

　　Contrarily, regime alignment may not be moderate among some Taiwanese. Two hegemonic views currently dominate the global arena, which remains the same as established during the Cold War: a United States-centered, democratic front, and an authoritarian-supported front centered around countries such as China, Russia, and Iran. For many Taiwanese who feel the economic and militaristic pressures of the US-China crossfire, a polarization in political identity occurs when it is felt that Taiwan has to either align more with the United States or with China in order to ease these tensions. For example, the KMT finds benefits in some relation with the PRC to maintain economic strength and cultural ties, particularly because the foundation of the KMT party is constructed of those who originally came from the mainland. However, other Taiwanese place precedence on national security and find greater benefit in maintaining overtly closer US ties. These divisive viewpoints exemplify the priorities some Taiwanese place in order to maximize welfare. Maintaining economic ties allows for continued trade and growth in the private sector, continuing the increase of the middle income for Taiwan, while others place emphasis on a national identity that is distinct from the mainland and announcing independence in order to achieve global recognition.

VI. Industrial and Infrastructural Funding

　　Emphasis on either developing infrastructure or developing industry represents a large point of contention regarding the policy desires of Taiwanese citizens. Further exacerbating these issues is that apart from commercial districts in major cities like Taipei, infrastructure such as public housing can tend to be at least several decades old. Those with lower income status in Taiwan must then bank heavily on reform from the government to allocate funding towards public services and infrastructure. In President Lai’s inaugural speech, ten points were listed related to improving public welfare. These include expanding social housing, childcare policies, labor insurance policies,  transportation safety, urban renewal, etc. For individuals who have a higher stake in public facilities and programs, voting for Lai’s improvement and expansion of public policy would be rational. There is thus a parallel to those who worked in industries such as plantations or fisheries centuries ago in Taiwan, who immigrated from China, advocating for better labor laws and fairer tax systems from Dutch and Japanese rulers. The difference is that now, in the contemporary period, civilians have the ability to democratically elect representatives who would establish the policies they seek.

　　A caveat with President Lai’s proposal to increase government spending on public programs, however, is that this would also take away from seed funding for the semiconductor industry, which was another core point in President Lai’s speech. As Taiwan leads the manufacturing of the semiconductor industry, the middle and upper classes have been expanding for the past several decades. This expansion has created a larger demand to fund facilities used to put semiconductors together in cities such as Hsinchu. The contradiction of interests arises when a limited budget for government spending must be allocated to either the public or private sector, the latter being the choice of interest for investors and those with a general stake in Taiwan’s economy alike. Although the polarization of class has not manifested in a disagreement between political parties, it will pose a policy challenge to Lai, who will have to weigh and prioritize which policies to fund first. Thus, class division creates polarized opinions on the policies promised by governments.

VII. Implications of Identity Polarization

　　The concerns of Taiwanese identity polarization are likely to present themselves in different levels of magnitude. Of topics related to ethnic affiliations, regime alignment, class differences, or generational experiences, the modern polarization of Taiwan’s population is largely in part due to regime alignment. This indicates a schism of political opinion in which many either align themselves with KMT or DPP policy stances. There are three significant points of contention related to policy that cause this polarization. 

　　First and most important is the concern of Cross-Strait relations: those who are KMT affiliated have a softer stance towards the CCP as many are descendants of mainlanders. This implies that KMT affiliates prefer a lack of US intervention in cross-strait relations, whereas DPP affiliates have a stronger stance on independence and US support. Since the security concerns over the sovereignty of Taiwan are greatest now more than ever, reducing the fractured identity of Taiwan must be done first. This must first be addressed in the military, since at academies such as Whampoa Military Academy, there are indications of varied views on the state of Taiwan and an idea of a Greater China. After addressing this concern among military ranks, a campaign for a united front among the public for the self-preservation of Taiwan must be put forth. While it is understood that KMT members have cultural ties to the mainland, the reasons for the KMT’s CCP-sympathetic views are still questionable.

　　The second most potent topic to address regarding polarization is the concern of domestic energy. The DPP has been regarded for its anti-nuclear energy stance in line with the common order with other nations. The pro-environmental stance of the DPP puts an emphasis on the reduction in usage of nuclear energy, as opposed to the KMT’s pro-nuclear stance, which has long since been a part of its energy policy structure. Whilst the DPP and its voters seek renewable ways to generate energy to push Taiwan in a “greener” direction, the KMT still adheres to traditional means of energy like continued funding of nuclear facilities. As it is up to citizens to determine which method of energy is best for Taiwan, what ought to be done is at least providing resources related to energy literacy so that voters can be educated and make sound decisions when determining which energy policy is best suited.

　　The last point of contention is the method of Taiwan’s military procurement. The particular concern revolves around which countries Taiwan interacts with in order to bolster military procurement, and in the contemporary period, the United States is at the center of the debate. For several years, the United States has been a top weapons and national security equipment provider for Taiwan and typically sends military aid in packages equipped with developed technology. This has drawn a division between the two large parties of Taiwan: the KMT, seeking to rely less on the United States for the cause of its ability to negotiate with the CCP, prefers not to seek weapons procurement from the United States. On the other hand, the DPP’s goal of maintaining strong US relations in the face of a threatening China is enhanced by purchasing US weapons, which grants access to military technology and an incentive for the United States to maintain a close tie with Taiwan.